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With traditional domestic imbalances long under control, the Chil-
ean business cycle is driven by external shocks. Chile’s external vul-
nerability is primarily a financial problem. A decline in the Chilean
terms of trade, for example, is associated with a decline in real gross
domestic product (GDP) that is many times larger than one would pre-
dict in the presence of perfect financial markets. The financial nature
of this excess sensitivity has two central dimensions: a sharp contrac-
tion in Chile’s access to international financial markets when it needs
it the most and an inefficient reallocation of this scarce access across
borrowers during external crises. I argue that Chile’s aggregate vola-
tility can be reduced significantly by fostering the private sector’s de-
velopment of financial instruments that are contingent on the main
external shocks faced by Chile. As a first step, the Central Bank or
international financial institutions could issue a benchmark instru-
ment contingent on these shocks. I also advocate a countercyclical
monetary policy (also contingent on these shocks), but mainly as an
incentive—that is, as a substitute for taxes on capital inflows and equiva-
lent—rather than for ex post liquidity purposes.
The essence of the mechanism through which external shocks
affect the Chilean economy can be characterized as follows. First, a
deterioration of the terms of trade raises the need for external re-
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sources if the real economy is to continue unaffected, but this triggers
exactly the opposite reaction from international financiers, who pull
back capital inflows. The latter occasionally occurs directly as a con-
tagion effect. Second, once external financial markets fail to accom-
modate the needs of domestic firms and households, these agents turn
to domestic financial markets, in particular to commercial banks.
Again, this increase in demand is not matched by an increase in sup-
ply since banks—particularly resident foreign institutions—tighten
domestic credit, opting instead to increase their net foreign asset po-
sitions. Third, the domestic financial system experiences a signifi-
cant “flight to quality,” which reinforces the above effects as large
firms find it more attractive to seek financing in domestic markets,
while the displaced small and medium-sized firms cannot access in-
ternational financial markets at any price.
The costs of this mechanism are high. Widespread financial con-
straints are binding during the crisis, when major forced adjust-
ments are needed. The sharp decline in domestic asset prices, and
the corresponding rise in expected returns, is driven by the extreme
scarcity in financial resources and their high opportunity cost. Even
the praised rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) that occurred
during the most recent crisis is a symptom of these fire sales. The
fact that this investment takes the form of control purchases rather
than portfolio or credit flows simply reflects some of the underlying
problems that limit Chile’s integration to international financial
markets: weak corporate governance and other “transparency” stan-
dards. Finally, the costs do not end with the crisis, since financially
distressed firms are ill equipped to mount a speedy recovery. The
latter often comes not only with the costs of a slow recovery in em-
ployment and activity, but also with a slowdown in the process of
creative destruction and productivity growth. In the United States,
the latter may account for about 30 percent of the costs of an aver-
age recession (see Caballero and Hammour, 1998), which is prob-
ably a very optimistic lower bound for the Chilean economy. More-
over, the presence of a severely large number of financially distressed
small firms reduces rather than enhances the effectiveness of mon-
etary policy in facilitating the recovery.
The distributional impact of this type of crisis is significant, as
well. On one end, large firms are directly affected by external shocks,
but they can substitute most of their financial needs domestically. They
are affected primarily by demand factors. On the other, small and me-
dium-sized enterprises (henceforth, SMEs) are crowded out and are se-379 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
verely constrained on the financial side. They are the residual claim-
ants of the financial crunch.
This diagnosis points in the direction of a structural solution based
on two building blocks. The first deals with the institutions required
to foster Chile’s integration to international financial markets and
the development of domestic financial markets. Chile is making sig-
nificant progress along this margin through its capital markets re-
form program. The second building block, which is necessary because
of the unavoidably slow nature of the above process, is to design an
appropriate international liquidity management strategy. This strat-
egy must be understood in broader terms than the Central Bank’s
management of international reserves, and it must include the devel-
opment of financial instruments that facilitate the delegation of this
task to the private sector.
I focus on the latter type of solution in this paper.1 I view the
policy problem as one of remedying a chronic private sector underin-
surance with respect to external crises.2 After outlining the main
sources of this problem and the corresponding solutions, I focus on
two. First, to develop a key missing market, I propose the creation of
a benchmark bond that is contingent on the main external shocks
faced by Chile. This instrument should facilitate the private sector’s
pricing and creation of similar and derivative contingent financial
instruments. Second, I discuss optimal monetary policy and interna-
tional reserve management from an insurance perspective. Provided
that the Central Bank of Chile has achieved a high degree of infla-
tion-target credibility, the optimal response to an external shock is a
moderate injection of reserves and an expansionary monetary policy.
The latter, however, is unlikely to have a large real impact and in-
deed will imply a sharp, short-lived exchange rate depreciation. The
main benefit of such a policy is in the incentives it provides. The
main problem is that it is time inconsistent.
The following section describes the essence of the external shocks
and the financial mechanism at work. Section 2 follows with a discus-
sion of the impact of this mechanism on the real side of the economy
and the different economic agents. Section 3 discusses policy options,
and section 4 concludes.
1. See Caballero (1999, 2001) for a discussion of the structural reforms aimed
at improving integration and the development of financial markets. More impor-
tant, Chile is in the process of enacting a major capital markets reform.
2. See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001c) for a formal discussion of this
perspective.380 Ricardo J. Caballero
1. THE SHOCK AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
This section illustrates the mechanism through which external
shocks affect the Chilean economy. I start off with a brief description of
the Chilean financial sector. I then organize the discussion of the role
played by the shocks and their amplification mechanisms around de-
mand and supply factors affecting the domestic banking system—the
backbone of the Chilean financial system. Finally, I focus on the most
recent cyclical episode, because the changing nature of the Chilean
financial system makes older data less relevant.
1.1 The Chilean Banking Sector
Banks are an important source of financing for Chilean firms. The
composition of financing is similar to that of advanced European econo-
mies (see table 1). The maturity structure of Chilean bank loans, how-
ever, is more concentrated on the short end: 57 percent of total loans
and 60 percent of commercial loans have a maturity of less than one
year.3 Chilean banks thus look like European banks in terms of their
relative importance, but they are more similar to U.S. banks in their
focus on short maturities.4
Chilean banks concentrate most of their activity on firms. Com-
mercial loans represent around 60 percent of total bank loans. If trade
loans are also taken into account, about 70 percent of total bank credit
Table 1. The Relative Importance of Bank Loansa
Percent
Source of financing Stock Flows
Loans  43  51
Equity  54  33
Bonds  3  16
a. Participation levels were built using the stocks from December 2000. Flows were computed as the difference
in stocks between December 1999 and December 2000, except for the flow of new equity, which was built using
information on equity placement during the period.
3. Computed using the stock of loans in December 1999, as reported by the
Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras.
4. In Germany, for example, more that 70 percent of the commercial loans are
long term. In contrast, in the United States short-term loans account for about 60
percent of nonresidential loans.381 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
supply is directed to firms. The remainder is allocated to mortgages
(15 percent), consumption loans (10 percent), and other types of loans
(5 percent).5
Chilean banks concentrate their lending activity on large firms, at
least when firm size is approximated by loan size. Large loans of over
US$1.4 million (in end-1999 dollars) capture 64 percent of the volume
of commercial loans. In contrast, only 14 percent is allocated to me-
dium-sized loans (between US$280,000 and US$ 1.4 million), while small
loans (below US$280,000) account for the remaining 22 percent.6
Banks in Chile are important when compared with other finan-
cial institutions, as well. Banks’ assets represent 60 percent of total
assets, whereas pension funds control 30 percent and insurance com-
panies 10 percent.7
Within the banking sector, foreign banks maintain a very signifi-
cant presence. Loans by foreign banks represented 42 percent of total
loans in 1999, versus 58 percent for domestic banks. Portfolio composi-
tion is roughly similar among the two types of banks, with loans ac-
counting for the largest share of assets (67 percent for foreign banks
and 80 percent for domestic). Considerable differences are seen, how-
ever, in the relative importance of foreign assets (15 percent for foreign
banks versus just 6 percent for domestic), securities (14 percent versus
11 percent), and reserves (4 percent versus 3 percent).8 Finally, note
that Chilean Banking Law does not recognize subsidiaries of foreign
banks as part of their main headquarters.
1.2 The External Shock and Its Impact on Domestic
Financial Needs
The trigger of the mechanism is illustrated in figure 1. Panel A
shows the path of Chile’s terms of trade and the spread paid by prime
Chilean instruments over the equivalent U.S. Treasury instrument. Chile
was severely affected by both at the end of the 1990s. Panel B offers a
better metric to gauge the magnitude of these shocks. Taking the quan-
5. Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras.
6. Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras.
7. Total assets are calculated as the sum of financial and fixed assets. Fixed
assets are not included for insurance companies, but they represent a very small
fraction of financial institutions’ assets. Ratios are based on the stock of assets in
December 2000, as reported by the Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones
Financieras and the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros.
8. Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras.Figure 1. External Shocksa
A. Terms of trade and sovereing spread
B. Terms of trade and interest rate effect ( fixed quantities)
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
a. Preliminary data used for 1999 and 2000. The yearly figure for 2000 was computed by multiplying the three-
quarter cummulative value by 4/3. In panel A, terms of trade is the ratio of export price index and import price
index computed by the Central Bank of Chile. The sovereign spread was estimated as the spread of ENERSIS-
ENDESA corporate bonds. The spread data for 1996 was estimated by the author using information from the
Central Bank. In panel B, the terms-of-trade effect was computed as the difference between the actual terms of
trade and the terms of trade at 1996 quantities. The interest rate effect was computed in similar fashion.383 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
tities from the 1996 current account as representative of those that would
have occurred in the economy absent any real adjustment, it translates
them into the dollar losses associated with the deterioration in the terms
of trade and interest rates. These losses amounted to about two percent
of GDP in 1998, with similar magnitudes for 1999 and 2000.
How should Chile have reacted to this sharp decline in national
income, in the absence of any significant financial friction (aside
from the temporary increase in the spread)? Figure 2 hints at the
answer. The thick line depicts the path of Chile’s actual consump-
tion growth, while the broken line illustrates the hypothetical path
of consumption growth if it were perfectly integrated with interna-
tional financial markets and if the terms of trade were the only source
of shocks.9 The figure has two interesting features. First, there is a
9. Consumption growth is very similar to GDP growth for this comparison.
Adding the income effect of interest rate shocks would not change things too
much, as these were very short lived. I neglect the presence of substitution effects
because there is no evidence of a consumption overshooting once international
spreads come down.
Figure 2. Excess Sensitivity of Real Consumption Growth to
Terms of Trade Shocksa
Source: Consumption growth: International Financial Statistics (IFS); copper prices (London Metal Exchange):
Datastream; copper exports: Chile’s Ministry of Finance.384 Ricardo J. Caballero
very high correlation between Chile’s business cycle and shocks to
its terms of trade. This correlation is not observed in other commod-
ity-dependent economies with more developed financial markets, such
as Australia or Norway (see Caballero 1999, 2001). Second, and more
important for the argument in this paper, the figure demonstrates
that the economy overreacts to these shocks by a significant mar-
gin. In the figure, the actual response of the economy is measured
on the left axis, while the hypothetical response is measured on the
right axis; the scale of the former is fully ten times larger than that
of the latter. In practice, terms-of-trade shocks are simply too tran-
sitory—especially when they are driven by demand, as in the recent
crisis—to justify a large response from the real side of the economy.10
The income effect that is measured in panel B of Figure 1 should, in
principle, translate almost entirely into increased borrowing from
abroad, but it does not do so in practice.
Returning to the crisis of the late 1990s, panel A of figure 3 illustrates
that international financial markets not only did not accommodate the
(potential) increase in demand for foreign resources, but capital inflows
actually declined rapidly over the period. While the Central Bank offset
part of this decline by injecting back some of its international reserves, it
clearly was not enough to offset both the decline in capital inflows and the
rise in external needs (see panel B). For example, the figure shows that in
1998, the injection of reserves amounted to approximately US$2 billion.
This is comparable to the direct income effect of the decline in the terms of
trades and the rise in interest rates, but it does not compensate for the
decline in capital inflows that came with these shocks.
How severe was the mismatch between the increase in needs and
the availability of external financial resources? Panel A of figure 4
has a back-of-the-envelope answer. It graphs the actual current ac-
count (light bars) and the current account with quantities fixed at
1996 levels (dark bars). At the trough, in 1999, the actual current
10. The price of copper has trends and cycles at different frequencies, some of
which are persistent (see Marshall and Silva, 1998). The sharp decline in the price of
copper in the late 1990s, however, undoubtedly resulted primarily from a transitory
demand shock brought about by the Asian and Russian crises. I would argue that
conditional on the information that the current shock was a transitory demand
shock, the univariate process used to estimate the present value impact of the
decline in the price of copper in figure 2 overestimates the extent of this decline. The
lower decline in futures prices is consistent with this view. The variance of the spot
price is six times the variance of fifteen-month-ahead futures prices. Moreover, the
expectations computed from the autoregression process track reasonably well with
the expectations implicit in futures markets, except for the very end of the sample
when liquidity premium considerations may have come into play.Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Figure 3. Capital Flows and Reserves
A. Capital account except reserves
B. Balance of paymentsSource: Central Bank of Chile.
a. In panel A, the current account at 1996 quantities was computed by multiplying the 1996 quantities by each
year’s price indices for exports, imports, and interest payments. The other components of the current account
were kept at current values. In panel B, the current account in 1996 prices was computed by multiplying the 1996
prices by each year’s quantities.
Figure 4. The Current Accounta
A. Current account and current account at 1996 quantities
B. Current account (current and in 1996 prices)Source: Central Bank of Chile.
a. Panel A corresponds to the sum of the terms of trade effect, the interest rate effect, and the decline in capital
inflows. Both the terms-of-trade and the interest rate effects are measured at 1996 quantities. The decline in
capital flows corresponds to the difference of the capital account except reserves with respect to its 1996 value.
Panel B subtracts from panel A the net change in Central Bank reserves. Panel C subtracts from panel B the net
increase in flows to the banking sector.
Figure 5. The Increase in Potential Financial Needsa
A. Comprehensive (mill. US$)
B. (A) minus reserves accummulation (mill. US$)
C. (B) minus flows to banking sector (mill. US$)388 Ricardo J. Caballero
account deficit was around US$4 billion less than what one would
have predicted using only the actual change in terms of trade. More-
over, this dollar adjustment underestimates the quantity adjustment
behind it, as the deterioration of the terms of trade typically worsens
the current account deficit for any path of quantities. The importance
of this price correction can be seen in panel B, which graphs the ac-
tual current account (light bars), and the current account at 1996
prices (dark bars). The latter clearly shows a significantly larger ad-
justment than the former.
Figure 5 reinforces the mismatch conclusion by reporting increas-
ingly conservative estimates of the shortage of external financial re-
sources by the nonbanking sector. Panel A describes the path of the
change in potential financial needs stemming from the decline in the
terms of trade and capital inflows, and the increase in spreads. Panel B
subtracts from panel A the injection of reserves by the Central Bank,
while panel C subtracts from panel B the decline in capital inflows to
the banking sector. The increase in financial needs for 1999 ranges
from about US$2 billion to just above US$7 billion. Regardless of the
method used, the mismatch is large, which creates a potentially large
surge in the demand for resources from the domestic financial system.
The difference between panels b and c shows that the domestic finan-
cial sector not only did not accommodate this increase in demand, but
also exacerbated the financial crunch.
Figure 6 illustrates additional dimensions that could have smoothed
the demand for resources from resident banks, although they did not
do so. Panels a and b carry the relatively good news. The former shows
that issues of new equity and corporate bonds did not decline very sharply,
although they hide the fact that the required return on these instru-
ments rose significantly. The latter panel illustrates that while the
pension funds increased their allocation of funds to foreign assets dur-
ing the period, this portfolio shift occurred mostly against public in-
struments. However, this decline probably translated into a large place-
ment of public bonds on some other market or institution that com-
petes with the private sector, like banks (see the discussion below).
Panel C, on the other hand, indicates that retained earnings, which
are a significant source of investment financing to Chilean firms, de-
clined significantly over the period.11 Finally, panel D illustrates that
11. Before the crises, in 1996, the stock of retained earnings represented 20
percent of total assets for the median firm. The difference between profits and
dividend payments (a measure of the flow of retained earnings) represented around
50 percent of total capital expenditures for the median firm in 1996.389 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
workers did not help accommodate the financial bottleneck either, as
the labor share rose steadily throughout the period.
The bottom line of this section is clear: during external crunches,
firms need substantial additional financial resources from resident
banks.
1.3 The (Supply) Response by Resident Banks
How did resident banks respond to increased demand? The short
answer is that they exacerbated rather than smooth the external shock.
Panel A in figure 7 shows that domestic loan growth actually slowed
sharply in the late 1990s, even as deposits kept growing. This tighten-
ing can also be seen in prices, through the sharp rise in the loan-de-
posit spread during the early phase of the recent crisis (see panel B).
While spreads started to fall by 1999, the strong substitution toward
prime firms makes it difficult to interpret this decline as a loosening in
credit standards.
The main substitutes for loans in banks’ portfolios are public
debt and external assets (see figure 8, panel A). Banks clearly moved
their assets toward external assets. Interestingly, the Central Bank
policy of fighting capital outflows with high domestic interest rates
was only temporarily successful, as evidenced by the reversal in the
last quarter of 1998. The rise in interest rates during the Russian
phase of the crisis seems to have succeeded mostly in slowing down
the decline in banks’ investment in public instruments, and it en-
couraged substitution away from loans. Banks exacerbated—rather
than smoothed—the loss of external funding by becoming part of the
capital outflows. In fact, while the banking sector also experienced a
large capital outflow during this episode (see panel B), much of the
net outflow was not due to a decline in their international credit
lines or inflows, but rather to an outflow toward foreign deposits and
securities (panel C).
Most resident banks exhibited this pattern to some degree, but resi-
dent foreign banks had the most pronounced portfolio shift toward for-
eign assets. This is apparent in panels a and b of figure 9, which present
the investment in domestic and foreign assets by foreign and domestic
(private) banks, respectively. While all banks increased their positions
in foreign assets, the trend was substantially more pronounced among
foreign banks. Moreover, domestic banks “financed” a larger fraction of
their portfolio shift by reducing investments other than loans. This
conclusion is confirmed in panel C, which shows the paths of theFigure 6. Additional Factorsa
A. Change in the stock of corporate debt and new equity
B. AFP holdings as fraction of GDP
Source: Central Bank of Chile; Santiago Stock Exchange; Superintendencia de AFP; Superintendencia de Valores
y Seguros.
In panel A, new equity is valued at issuance price and deflated using the consumer price index (CPI). The stock
of corporate debt outstanding was also deflated by the CPI. The December 1998 exchange rate was 432 pesos perFigure 6. (continued)
C. Retained eamings
D. Labor share
US dollar. In panel B, the values are expressed as a fraction of the year’s GDP. In panel C, the data on retained
earnings correspond to the stocks of retained earning reported in the balance sheets of all the companies traded
in that exchange. They exclude investment firms, pension funds, and insurance companies. The flow value was
computed as the difference in the (deflated) stocks at time t and t – 1.Source: Central Bank of Chile; Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros.
a. In panel A, loans include commercial, consumption, and trade loans and mortgages. Deposits include sight
deposits and time deposits. The values are expressed in December 1998 dollars, using the average December 1998
exchange rate (472 pesos/dollar). In panel B, the thirty-day interest rates are nominal, while the ninety-day and
one-year rates are real (to a first order, this distinction should not matter for spread calculations).
Figure 7. The Credit Cruncha
A. Loans and deposits of the banking system
B. Interest rate spreads (annual %)Source: Central Bank of Chile; Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras.
a. Domestic assets include Central Bank securities with secondary market and intermediated securities. External
assets are the sum of deposits abroad and foreign securities. Deposits abroad are mostly sight deposits in
foreign (nonresident) banks. Foreign securities are mostly foreign bonds.
Figure 8. Capital Flows of the Banking Systema
A. Investment in domestic and external assets
B. Net capital inflows
C. Composition of  foreign assetsSource: Santiago Securities Exchange.
a. Domestic banks do not include Banco del Estado. Banco BHIF and Banco Santiago, which changed from domestic
to foreign ownership during the period, were excluded from the sample. All constant 1998-peso series were converted
to US dollars using the average exchange rate in December 1998 (472 pesos/dollar). Deposits include sight and time
deposits. Loans include commercial, consumption, and trade loans, and mortgages. In panels A and B, domestic
assets include Central Bank securities with secondary market and intermediated securities; external assets are the
sum of deposits abroad and foreign securities. In panel C, loan-to-deposit ratios are normalized to one in March 1996.
Figure 9. Comparing Foreign and Domestic Bank Behaviora
A. Investment in domestic and external assets of foreign banks
B. Investment in domestic and external assets of domestic banks
C. Loans over deposits of domestic and foreign banks
except BHIF and Banco Santiago395 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
loans-to-deposit ratios of foreign (dashes) and domestic (solid) banks.12
The question arises whether factors other than nationality (such
as the banks’ risk characteristics) determined the differential response.
While this is certainly a theme to be explored more thoroughly, the
evidence in figure 10 suggests that this is not the case. Panel A shows
that foreign banks did not experience a rise in net foreign currency
liabilities that could account for additional hedging. They did not ex-
perience a significantly sharper rise in nonperforming loans than did
domestic banks (panel B), and they were not affected by a tighter capi-
tal-adequacy constraint (panel C).
Foreign banks generally play many useful roles in emerging econo-
mies, but they do not seem to help smooth external shocks (at least in
the most recent crisis). The credit and risk strategies of these banks
are probably dictated from abroad, and there is no particular reason to
expect them to behave too differently from other foreign investors dur-
ing these times.
In summary, in 1999—perhaps the worst full year of the crisis—banks
reduced loan growth by approximately US$2 billion.13 The increase in
financial needs by the nonbanking private sector was about US$2 billion,
as well (see figure 5, panel C). Although these simple calculations ignore
many general equilibrium issues, it is probably not too far-fetched to con-
clude that the financial crunch was extremely large, perhaps around US$4
billion (about 5 to 6 percent of GDP) in that single year.
2. THE COSTS
The impact of the financial crunch on the economy is correspond-
ingly large, especially on small and medium-sized firms.
12. This figure excludes two banks (Banco BHIF and Banco Santiago) that changed
from domestic to foreign ownership during the period. The change in statistical clas-
sification took place in November 1998 for Banco BHIF and in July 1999 for Banco
Santiago. In the case of Banco Santiago, the takeover operation by Banco Santander
(the largest foreign bank in Chile) actually took place in May 1999. The Chilean bank
regulatory agency (Superintendencia de Bancos) assumed that the two banks were
going to merge and therefore ordered Banco Santiago to reduce its market presence.
(The two banks had a joint presence equivalent to 29 percent of total loans.) The
banks finally decided not to merge, and their joint market presence has remained
unaltered thus far. The confusion created by the potential participation limits prob-
ably did not help the severe credit crunch that Chile was experiencing at the time.
13. A number close to US$2 billion is obtained from the difference between
the flow of loans during 1999 (computed as the change in the stock of loans
between December 1999 and December 1998) and the flow of loans in 1996 (com-
puted in a similar manner).Source: Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras.
a. In panel A, foreign assets include foreign loans, deposits abroad, and foreign securities. Foreign liabilities
include funds borrowed from abroad and deposits in foreign currency. In panel B, ROE is the ratio of total
profits over capital and reserves (as a percentage). Domestic private banks do not include Banco del Estado.
Figure 10. Risk Characteristics of Foreign and Domestic
Banksa
A. Foreign currency assets and liabilities: foreign banks
B. Non performing loans as percentage of total loans:
domestic and foreign banks
C. Capital adequacy ratio397 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
2.1 The Aggregates
Figure 2 summarized the first-order impact of the financial mecha-
nism, with a domestic business cycle that is many times more volatile
than it would be if financial markets were perfect. This excess volatil-
ity was particularly pronounced in the recent slowdown, as illustrated
by panel A in figure 11. National income and domestic demand not only
appear to move together, but the latter adjusts more than the former,
implying that the largely transitory terms-of-trade shock is not being
smoothed over time. Panel B illustrates a sharp rise in the unemploy-
ment rate that has yet to be reversed.
Aside from the direct negative impact of the slowdown and any
additional uncertainty that may have been created by the untimely
discussion of a new labor code, the buildup in unemployment and its
persistence can be linked to two aspects of the financial mechanism
described above. First, in the presence of an external financial con-
straint, the real exchange rate needs a larger adjustment for any given
decline in the terms of trade.14 Consequently, a big share of the adjust-
ment falls on the labor-intensive nontradables sector, as illustrated in
panel A of figure 12. Second, going beyond the crisis and into the recov-
ery, the lack of financial resources hampers job creation, a phenom-
enon that is particularly acute among SMEs. While I do not have data
on job creation, panel B shows that investment suffered a deeper and
more prolonged recession than the rest of domestic aggregate demand.
This is important beyond its impact on unemployment, as it also hints
at the slowdown of one of the main engines of productivity growth: the
restructuring process. If the United States is any indication of the costs
associated with this slowdown in restructuring—possibly a very opti-
mistic lower bound for the Chilean costs—this mechanism may add a
significant productivity loss amounting to over 30 percent of the em-
ployment cost of the recession.15
As the external constraint tightens, all domestic assets that are
not part of international liquidity must lose value sharply to offer sig-
nificant excess returns to the few agents with the will and liquidity to
buy them. Panel A of figure 13 shows a clear trace of this V-pattern in
the Chilean stock market. Panel B is perhaps more interesting, as it
illustrates that foreign direct investment (FDI) increased by almost
14. The larger real exchange rate adjustment corresponds to the dual of the
financial constraint. See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001c).
15. See Caballero and Hammour (1998).Source: Central Bank of Chile; National Bureau of Statistics (INE).
a. Series are seasonally adjusted and annualized.
Figure 11. Output, Demand, and Unemploymenta
A. Domestic demand and national income
B. Unemployment rateSource: Central Bank of Chile.
a. Series are seasonally adjusted and normalized to one in March 1996. The tradables sector includes agricul-
ture, fishing, mining, and manufacturing; the nontradables sector includes electricity, gas and water, construc-
tion, commerce, transport and telecommunications, and other services.
Figure 12. Forced and Depressed Restructuringa
A. GDP tradable and non-tradable
B. Evolution of domestic demand400 Ricardo J. Caballero
US$4.5 billion in 1999 and created a bottom to the fire sale of domestic
assets. However, while FDI is very useful in that it provides external
resources when they are most scarce, its presence during the crisis
also reflects the severe costs of the external financial constraint, as
valuable assets are sold at heavy discounts.
2.2 The Asymmetries
The real consequences of the external shocks and the financial
amplification mechanism are felt differently across firms of different
sizes. Large firms are directly affected by the external shock, but
they can substitute their financial needs domestically. They are af-
fected primarily by price and demand factors. SMEs, on the other
hand, are crowded out of domestic financial markets and thus become
severely constrained financially. They are the residual claimants of
the financial dimension of the mechanism described above, as are
indebted consumers to a lesser extent.
Figure 14 illustrates some aspects of this asymmetry. First, panel
A shows the path of the share of large loans as an imperfect proxy for
resident bank loans going to large firms. Next, panel B, shows a sharp
increase in the relative size of large loans. The two trends together hint
at a substantial reallocation of domestic loans toward relatively large
firms. In the policy section below, I argue that some of this reallocation
is likely to be socially inefficient.
The next figure looks at relatively large, publicly traded firms.16
The figure points to important differences between the largest of them
and the medium-sized ones. A comparison of the paths of medium-sized
and large firms’ bank liabilities (normalized by initial assets) during
the recent slowdown indicates that larger firms fared better than me-
dium-sized companies, which saw their level of loans frozen through-
out 1999. Perhaps more importantly, since the sum of loans to me-
dium-sized and large firms rose while total loans declined throughout
the crisis, the contraction must have been particularly significant
among smaller firms (not shown in the figure).
16. The firms included in Figure 15 are drawn from the Ficha Estadística
Codificada Uniforme (FECU), which is the standardized balance sheet that every
public firm in Chile is required to file quarterly with the supervisory authority (the
Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros). The database contains information on
those standardized balance sheets for every public firm reporting to the authority
between the first quarter of 1996 and the first quarter of 2000.Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg.
a. The IGPA is the general stock price index of the Santiago Stock Exchange.
Figure 13. Fire Sales
A. Value of Chilean stocks (IGPA index)a
B. Foreign direct investment (FDI)Source: Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras.
a. Large loans: over 50,000 UF (about US$1.4 million in 1999 dollars); small loans: between 400 UF (US$11,000)
and 10,000 UF (US$280,000) . In panel B, the average size corresponds to the stock of loans in each class divided
by the number of debtors.
Figure 14. Flight to Qualitya
A. Share of large loans in total loans
B. Average size of small and large loans403 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
The Chilean economy is thus still very vulnerable to external shocks
despite significant institutional development over the last two decades.
The main reason for this vulnerability appears to be a double-edged
financial mechanism, which includes a sharp tightening of Chile’s ac-
cess to international financial markets and a significant reallocation of
resources from the domestic financial system toward larger corpora-
tions, public bonds, and, most significantly, foreign assets.
3. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND A PROPOSAL
The previous diagnostic points at the occasional tightening of an
external financial constraint—especially when the terms of trade dete-
riorate—as the trigger for the costly financial mechanism.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the standard form Ficha Estadistica Codificada Uniforme
(FECU), Superintendence of Securities and Insurance.
a. The sample includes all firms that continuously reported information between December 1996 and March
2000. Within this sample, the medium-sized firms (thus termed since they are larger than firms outside the
sample) are those with total assets below the median level of total assets in December 1996. The series correspond
to the total stock of bank liabilities at all maturities expressed in 1996 pesos, divided by the total level of assets
in December 1996. The nominal values were deflated using the CPI. The total level of assets in December 1996 was
US$788 million for the group of medium-sized firms and US$59.3 billion for the group of large firms.
Figure 15. Bank Debt of Publicly Traded Firms, By Sizea
A. Bank liabilities of medium and large firms404 Ricardo J. Caballero
3.1 General Policy Considerations
If the above assessment is correct, it calls for a structural solution
based on two building blocks: measures aimed at improving Chile’s
integration to international financial markets and the development of
domestic financial markets, and measures aimed at improving the al-
location of financial resources in times of external distress and across
states of nature. The first set of measures is already broadly under-
stood, at least as an objective, and Chile is making significant progress
along this dimension through its capital markets reform program. I
therefore focus on the second group as the guiding principle of the policy
discussion below. That is, I focus primarily on the international liquid-
ity management problem raised by the above analysis.17
International liquidity management is primarily an insurance prob-
lem with respect to those (aggregate) shocks that trigger external crises.
Solutions to this problem must have a contingent nature. The first step
is to identify a set of shocks that captures a large share of the triggers to
the mechanism described above. In the case of Chile, the terms of trade,
J.P. Morgan Latin American Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (Latin
EMBI+), and weather variables represent a good starting point. The par-
ticular index chosen, however, is a central aspect of the design, and it
needs to be extensively explored before it is implemented.
The second step is to identify desirable ex post transfers (perhaps
temporary loans rather than outright transfers). Broadly speaking,
these are simply transfers from foreign to domestic agents and from
less constrained domestic agents to more constrained ones. In practice,
however, the needs and availability of agents are greatly heterogeneous,
which raises information requirements considerably. It is thus highly
desirable to let the private sector take over the bulk of the solution,
which begs the question of why this sector is not already doing as much
as is needed. The answer to this question should identify the policy
goals with the highest returns.
The most likely explanations can be grouped into two categories: sup-
ply and demand factors. At least three supply factors figure prominently.
Coordination problems. These arise from the absence of a well-
defined benchmark around which the market can be organized.
17. See Caballero (1999, 2001) for general policy recommendations for the
Chilean economy, including recommendations on the first set of measures. My
objective in the current paper is instead to focus on and deepen the discussion of
a subset of those policies and to add an implementation dimension.405 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
Limited insurance capital. This situation may stem from either
structural shortages or a financial constraint (in the sense that what
is missing is assets that can be credibly pledged by the “insurer,” rather
than actual funds during a crisis). A closely related problem, but with
coordination aspects as well, is that the liquidity and collateral risks
faced by the insurers increase when the market encompasses an insuf-
ficient number of participants.
Sovereign (dual-agency) problems. Although contracts are signed
by private parties, government actions affect the payoffs of these
contracts.18
Demand factors, in turn, also account for at least three sources of
underinsurance.
Financial underdevelopment. This leads to a private undervalua-
tion of insurance with respect to aggregate shocks, which depresses
effective competition for domestically available external liquidity at times
of crises and reduces the private (but not the social) valuation of inter-
national liquidity.19
Sovereign problems. The government may provide explicit or im-
plicit insurance to the private sector.
Behavioral problems. Overly optimistic market participants un-
dervalue the need for insurance.
Domestic financial underdevelopment is still a problem in Chile.
The solution to this problem should be pursued primarily through fi-
nancial market reform. In the meantime, however, an adequate use of
monetary and reserves management policy may remedy some of the
underinsurance implications of this deficiency. I briefly discuss the gen-
eral features of this policy in the next section. A more extensive discus-
sion can be found in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001a).
At the same time, behavioral problems seem to be a pervasive
human phenomenon (see, for example, Shiller, 1993). The macroeco-
nomic implications of this factor can partly be remedied through the
same mechanisms designed to address financial underdevelopment.
Great care must be taken, however, not to generate a sizeable sover-
eign-insurance problem, which is otherwise not likely to be present in
any significant amount in the case of Chile (and nor are dual-agency
problems).
This process of elimination leaves coordination problems as the main
focus of my policy proposal, which is discussed extensively in section 3.3.
18. See, for example, Tirole (2000).
19. See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001b, 2001c).406 Ricardo J. Caballero
3.2 Monetary Policy as a Solution to the
Underinsurance Problem
Figure 16 provides a stylized characterization of an external crises
of the sort described above. The main problem during an emerging
market crisis is well captured by the presence of a vertical external
constraint. That is, external crises occur when it becomes very diffi-
cult, at the margin, for most domestic agents to gain access to interna-
tional financial markets at any price. Consequently, international li-
quidity becomes scarce, and domestic competition for these resources
bid up the dollar cost of capital, id, over the international interest rate
faced by prime (international) Chilean assets, i*. The dual of this crunch
is a sharp fall in investment.
A few aspects of this perspective of a crisis have caused some confu-
sion in the past. First, particularly in the case of Chile, the rise in the
sovereign (or prime firms’) spread is not a measure of the rise in the
domestic (shadow or observed) rate, id; rather, it represents the rise in
i*, which in turn may tighten the vertical constraint.
Second, the country does not need to literally run out of interna-
tional liquidity for the vertical constraint to bind for small and less-
than-prime firms. In fact, total scarcity is seldom the case in Chile. If
prime firms, banks, and the government perceive that there is a sig-
nificant chance of a severe external crisis in the future, they may de-
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cide to hoard international liquidity rather than lend it domestically,
even when the current domestic spread (id – i*) is positive.
Finally, the constraint is seldom completely vertical in practice. The
logic of the analysis that follows must therefore be blended with a stan-
dard Mundell-Fleming analysis. The interesting new insight, however,
is still that which is related to the nonflat aspect of the supply of funds.20
Ex Post Optimal Monetary and Reserves Policy
during a Crisis
Before discussing optimal policy from an insurance perspective, it
is worth highlighting the incentives that a central bank faces during
an external crisis. The main shortage experienced by the country is
one of international liquidity (or collateral, broadly understood). Thus,
an injection of international reserves into the market is a very power-
ful tool: it directly relaxes the vertical constraint on investment in fig-
ure 16, and it stabilizes the exchange rate. During an external crisis,
international arbitrage does not hold because there is an external credit
constraint. Domestic arbitrage, on the other hand, must hold. Peso
and dollar instruments backed by domestic collateral must yield the
same expected return (risk aversion aside). The domestic arbitrage con-
dition is thus
()
dp ii e E e =+− , (1)
where ip denotes the peso interest rate, e the (logarithm of the) cur-
rent exchange rate, and Ee the expected interest rate for the next
period. In what follows, I take the latter as given, although interest-
ing interactions arise when this expectation is affected by policy (see
Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001a).
Rearranging equation 1 yields an expression for the exchange rate:
dp eE ei i −= − , (2)
which shows that as id falls with the injection of reserves, the exchange
rate appreciates for any given peso interest rate.
20. Part of the explanation of the diagonal shape, in practice, is that the cur-
rency depreciates as id rises. If exports are an important dimension of the country’s
international liquidity, then a depreciation increases international collateral.408 Ricardo J. Caballero
The effectiveness of reserve injections in boosting investment and
protecting the exchange rate contrasts sharply with the impact of an
expansionary monetary policy. The main problem during an external
crisis is the lack of international—rather than domestic—liquidity.
Domestic liquidity facilitates domestic loans; hence the role of ip in the
investment function in figure 16 (given id, lower peso interest rates
raise investment demand). Domestic liquidity does not, however, relax
the binding international financial constraint, to a first order. Conse-
quently, an expansionary monetary policy is not effective in boosting
real investment in equilibrium. Its main impact is, instead, to raise
domestic competition for the limited international liquidity; hence id.
By equation 2, this means that the exchange rate depreciates sharply,
as it must not only offset the reduction in ip (the standard channel), but
also absorb the rise in id.
A central bank that has an inflation target and that is concerned
with the impact of the exchange rate on that target will thus prefer to
tighten monetary policy. Doing otherwise does not have much real ben-
efit during a crisis, and it can lead to a sharp exchange rate depreciation.
Ex Ante Optimal Monetary and Reserves Policy
during Crisis
If the central bank could commit to a monetary policy ex ante,
would it still choose to tighten during a crisis? The answer is no. The
primary problem is the private sector’s underinsurance with respect to
aggregate external shocks. The amount of international liquidity that
the country has during an external crisis may be exogenous at the time
of the crisis, but it is not exogenous ex ante. It depends on several
factors, including how much international borrowing occurred during
the boom years, the maturity structure and denomination of that debt,
the contingent credit lines contracted, and the sectoral allocation of
investment. Underinsurance means that these decisions did not fully
internalize the social cost of sacrificing a unit of international liquid-
ity. Figure 17 captures this gap by adding a social valuation curve to
figure 16. The gap ∆  – id captures the undervaluation problem. In other
words, if the private sector’s expected value of a unit of liquidity had
been ∆  as opposed to id, then private investors would have hoarded
more international liquidity and the vertical constraint during the cri-
sis would have shifted to the right.
Thus, while an expansionary monetary policy during a crisis is
unable to boost investment, the anticipation thereof is. If private agents409 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
anticipate such a policy, they will expect a higher id and hence will
make ex ante decision more in line with those of the social planner. In
this context, the main role of monetary policy is one of incentives rather
than one of liquidity provision.
What about international reserve injections? They are still optimal
ex ante, but the fall in id they bring about has a perverse incentive
effect that also needs to be offset by the expansionary monetary policy.
Before concluding this section, I mention two caveats. First, a
related but distinct type of monetary policy ineffectiveness arises dur-
ing the recovery phase of an external crunch. While international
liquidity may no longer be the binding constraint in this phase, a new
constraint arises in the form of the lack of domestic collateral among
SMEs—lost during the international crunch. An expansionary mon-
etary policy in this case injects resources into the banking system,
but it does not reach SMEs, since the binding constraint is not the
availability of loanable funds.
Second, I have taken Ee as given throughout. If this is not war-
ranted, in the sense that the commitment to a post-crisis inflation tar-
get is not sufficiently credible and is seriously compromised by policies
during the external crunch, then monetary policy may not be an avail-
able incentive mechanism. Having lost the latter, the authorities may
have to resort to much costlier incentive mechanisms such as capital
controls. This is not the case in Chile today.
Figure 17. Underinsurance410 Ricardo J. Caballero
3.3 Creating a Market: Issuing a Benchmark-
Contingent Instrument
As mentioned above, another key factor behind underinsurance is
simply a coordination problem. While there are many ways to hedge
and to hoard international liquidity, they tend to be cumbersome and
costly for most, especially when the goal is to obtain long-term insur-
ance. The basic proposal here is extremely simple: the Central Bank
or, preferably, one of the international financial institutions should is-
sue a financial instrument—a bond, for now—that is contingent on the
shocks identified in step one in section 3.1. Ideally, this bond should be
free of other risks and thus should be underwritten by a reputable first
issuer. The issue should be significant enough to attract the participa-
tion of international institutional investors, which would generate its
liquidity. Some of the desired insurance will be achieved directly by
this bond, but its main purpose is simply to create the market. With
the basic contingency well priced, the private sector will find it sub-
stantially simpler to engineer its own contingent instruments.
The contingency generated via this mechanism addresses only the
expected differential impact of the aggregate shocks contained in the
index. Individual agents will generate heterogeneity in their effective
hedging through their net positions rather than through a change in
the specific contingency.21 Other, more idiosyncratic underinsurance
problems are also welfare reducing, but they are less connected with
aggregate stabilization, which is the concern of this paper.22
In principle, the question of how responsive the contingency should
be to the underlying insurance factors or indexes is irrelevant, since
the private sector should be able to develop the derivative markets that
can generate any slope they may need. In practice, however, financial
constraints and liquidity considerations suggest otherwise. The bond
contingency should therefore be very steep, so as to minimize the lever-
age and derivative instruments required to generate an appropriate
amount of insurance for large crises. The counterpart will probably be
21. See Shiller’s (1993) seminal work on promoting the creation of macro-
markets as a mechanism for insuring microeconomic risks. While much of his
reasoning also applies in the context I discuss, my ultimate focus is on the equilib-
rium (macroeconomic) benefits of microeconomic insurance with respect to mac-
roeconomic shocks, rather than on the direct microeconomic welfare-enhancing
features of such insurance.
22. Insurance against aggregate shocks is also more likely to support a mar-
ket instrument as its solution, as opposed to more expensive (less liquid) individu-
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a very limited insurance against small and intermediate shocks, which
should be fine since these shocks seldom trigger the financial amplifi-
cation mechanism highlighted in this paper.
How much insurance does a country need? This question is not
easy to answer because it involves many general equilibrium consider-
ations. Even so, a very conservative answer for a full-insurance upper
bound should not be very far from the partial equilibrium answer. Cri-
ses deep enough to trigger the complex scenarios recently experienced
by Chile are probably once-in-a-decade events; the estimates presented
earlier on the shortfall of resources indicate that they probably involve
about US$5 billion a year and last for at most two years. (Longer reces-
sions probably stem from the damage created by the lack of insurance,
rather than the direct effect of the external shocks.) The required in-
surance is only a fraction of this shortfall, however, since these re-
sources need only be lent, not transferred. If I conservatively assume
that the average (shadow, not sovereign) spread on Chilean external
debt rises by 600 basis points, then the required insurance is effec-
tively US$300 million per crisis year (with the loan commitment or
credit line). Combining all these factors puts the fair price of full insur-
ance at around US$60 million a year. Of course, prices for this type of
insurance are never fair, but the point of this back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation is that the amounts involved are not large.
Mapping the above onto the size of the contingent bond issues re-
quired depends on the slope of the contingency, the amount of insur-
ance required (full insurance is highly unlikely to be optimal), and
other design issues. The benchmark bond should represent only a small
fraction of the total amount, since the private sector should follow suit.
The issue cannot be too small, however, since it needs to be liquid enough
from the outset.
The above discussion refers to the insurance between foreign and
domestic agents, but a substantial amount of domestic insurance is also
needed. Large corporations with better access to international financial
markets should be able to profit from arbitraging their access to smaller
domestic firms, rather than moving inward to borrow in the domestic
markets during time of distress, as happened in the recent episode. The
domestic banking system is probably the natural institution for admin-
istering this side of the contingent strategy, which would probably re-
quire regulatory changes to accommodate this new role without causing
undesirable domestic credit crunches as the index moves around.
The question arises of whether the development of such contin-
gency has any obvious advantage over the admittedly simpler strategy412 Ricardo J. Caballero
of internationalizing the peso—that is, of placing abroad bonds denomi-
nated in Chilean pesos. The Central Bank is currently pursuing this
strategy with the support of a recent World Bank issuance of US$105
million in peso-denominated bonds.23 These bonds serve a role similar
to that of the contingent instruments I propose in that the shocks in-
dexing the contingency will in all likelihood put pressure on the ex-
change rate, but they have a clear disadvantage: because the Chilean
authorities largely control the value of the peso, this contingency is
unlikely to appeal to the insurers (or bond holders) as much as an
exogenous contingency would. Moreover, and somewhat paradoxically,
a peso-denominated bond may not only be subject to a higher premium
owing to the risk of the Central Bank’s manipulation of the exchange
rate, but it may also prove to be a not very effective insurance mecha-
nism if, for example, the authorities decide to dampen an exchange
rate depreciation that is putting an inflation target at risk.24
The disadvantage of the contingent bond, on the other hand, is that
it is more difficult to implement, and the risk of not finding a market for
it is thus nonnegligible. It will require careful planning to design an
instrument that it is not difficult to comprehend and whose contingen-
cies are fully transparent. The experiences of previous placements of
commodity-indexed bonds should be studied carefully. Although bonds
with warrants on the issuer’s shares have become fairly common finan-
cial instruments, bonds embedded with options on commodity prices are
still relatively rare. These commodity-indexed bonds have generally been
attractive to investors who would like to participate in commodity op-
tions but cannot purchase directly for regulatory or other reasons. While
these instruments can be quite complex, they can always be broken down
(and thus valued) as the sum of fairly standard securities.
In 1986, for example, Standard Oil of Ohio created an issue of oil-
indexed notes, in which the principal payment was a function of oil
prices at maturity. The holder of a 1990 note received—in addition to a
guaranteed principal amount—the value of 170 barrels of Light Sweet
23. The bond was floated on 31 May 2000 for 55 billion Chilean pesos. The
bonds have a five-year maturity (to be repaid on 4 June 2005) and a coupon of 6.6
percent, and they are indexed to Chilean inflation. Most of the issue was acquired
by Chilean institutional investors (75 percent), while the rest was placed among
international investors. Chase Manhattan International Ltd. of New York acted
as the director bank.
24. This is the so-called fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). In prin-
ciple, one could think of an optimal amount of external peso debt at which the
moral hazard problem is exactly offset by the fear-of-floating effect. In practice,
such a mechanism may introduce significant policy uncertainty among investors.413 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
Oklahoma Crude Oil, with a price floor of $25 and price ceiling of $40.
Investors essentially held a standard four-year bond that included a
long call option with an exercise price of $25 and a short call option
with an exercise price of $40.
The recent securitization of catastrophe insurance contracts in the
United States similarly offers several important lessons.25 The first
placements of these instruments faced numerous obstacles, ranging
from investors’ lack of understanding of their contingencies to the legal
obstacles stemming from, for example, the great confusion on whether
to classify these instruments as bonds or as insurance and hence on
which institution should regulate them. Another lesson from the catas-
trophe risk experience is that these bonds will probably pay a signifi-
cant premium early on, but this premium should come down rapidly.26
Since this declining path creates a natural incentive for a war of attri-
tion in the private placement of these bonds, it reinforces the conclu-
sion that the process needs to be started by the Chilean authorities or
an international financial institution.27
4. FINAL REMARKS
There is no reason to stop at financial markets. Once the contin-
gent index has been created, contracts indexed to it can naturally arise.
Chile’s financial market already operates with an inflation index (the
unidad de fomento, or UF), which has removed much of the uncer-
tainty that microeconomic agents once experienced as a result of high,
unstable inflation. The new contingency may be institutionalized to
perform a similar role with regard to the uncertainty generated by
financially amplified external shocks. For example, labor markets, such
as minimum wages and temporary contracts, could be indexed to the
contingent index to ease firms’ financial difficulties during external
crises. The structural fiscal surplus could also be indexed to free up
financial resources to the private sector during those times.
Finally, regional interactions are also important. It may be worth
giving up some of the benefits of specifically tailoring the instrument to
Chilean needs in exchange for a much more liquid contingent bond
25. See Froot (1999).
26. The first catastrophe (or CAT) bonds, which were placed in 1997, initially
paid a premium over nine times the expected loss. By 1999, that premium had
steadily declined by nearly forty percent.
27. There is also some evidence that CAT options paid a lower initial excess
premium than CAT bonds. See Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips (2000).414 Ricardo J. Caballero
that includes other advanced emerging economies of the region, such
as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. It may even prove advantageous to
search for co-issuers beyond Latin America, with contingency needs
not too distant from those of Chile.415 Coping with Chile’s External Vulnerability
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